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II. ARGUMENT IN REPLY 
A. The District Court Erred in Concluding that Mr. Jimenez Did Not File His 
Successive Petition Within a Reasonable Time 
1. The "reasonable time" to bring a successive petition does not begin until the 
underlying proceedings are concluded 
The district court found each of Mr. Jimenez's claims untimely by analyzing the time that 
had passed since he had "notice" of the factual basis of his claim. For example, with respect to 
Mr. Jimenez's claim concerning the DNA evidence, the district court analyzed whether the 
successive claim was filed within a reasonable time from the district court's denial of the motion 
for DNA testing on September 19, 2011. 
However, to determine whether a petitioner filed a successive petition within a reasonable 
time from receiving notice of the factual basis for the claim, courts must also necessarily consider 
the status of related litigation. Here, Mr. Jimenez filed his successive petition while the appeal 
concerning the initial petition was (and is) still pending and the district court's conclusion that 
his successive petition was untimely is erroneous. 
Citing to Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 904, 174 P.3d 870, 874 (2007), the state 
claims Mr. Jimenez's argument that the status ofrelated proceedings is relevant to the timeliness 
issue is frivolous because there is no fixed limitation period for bringing a successive petition 
and successive petitions must be filed within a reasonable time after claims are discovered. 
Respondent's Brief, p. 11. The state is incorrect. 
a. The time-limits and special procedures applicable in death penalty cases 
do not serve as the yardstick to determine a reasonable time to file a 
successive petition in non capital cases 
In Charboneau, the Court held that "in determining what a reasonable time is for filing a 
1 
successive petition [under LC. § 19-4908], we will simply consider it on a case-by-case basis, as 
has been done in capital cases." Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 905, 174 P.3d at 875. The Court 
further indicated that timeliness is measured from the date of notice, not from the date a 
petitioner assembles a complete cache of evidence. Id. By holding that the timeliness of non 
death penalty successive petitions is determined on a case-by-case basis, the Court did not 
incorporate the time-limits and special procedures applicable in death penalty cases as the 
yardstick to determine a reasonable time in non capital cases. Indeed, such a conclusion would 
not only be inconsistent with the direction to analyze reasonableness on the unique facts of each 
case but also work surprise and injustice. 
Death penalty cases are governed by "special appellate and post-conviction" procedures 
set forth in Idaho Code§ 19-2719 to eliminate "unnecessary delay in carrying out a valid death 
sentence." Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 57, 106 P.3d 376, 383 (2004). In a capital case, a 
claimant for post-conviction relief has a sole opportunity to raise all challenges to the conviction 
and sentence, which must be raised in one post-conviction application within 42 days of the 
filing of the judgment imposing the death penalty. Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 57, 106 P.3d 
376, 383 (2004). Ineffective assistance of counsel is a claim that should be reasonably known 
immediately upon the completion of the trial and can be raised in a post-conviction proceeding. 
State v. Rhoades, 120 Idaho 795, 807, 820 P.2d 665, 677 (1991). 
The harsh effect of the expedited and unified procedures mandated in death penalty cases 
is ameliorated by the automatic appointment of independent counsel to assist the petitioner with 
his post-conviction remedies. See ICR 44.2. The district judge who sentenced the defendant [to 
death] shall appoint at least one attorney to represent the defendant for the purpose of seeking 
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any post-conviction remedy referred to in I.C. Section 19-2719( 4). ICR 44.2. The attorney 
appointed must "be someone other than counsel who represented the defendant prior to the 
imposition of the death penalty" who "shall not be considered to be co-counsel with any other 
attorney who represents the defendant, but may also be appointed to pursue the direct appeal for 
the defendant." Id. Thus, a death penalty petitioner has the assistance of independent counsel 
immediately following the conviction to assist in identifying and presenting ineffective assistance 
of counsel claims in addition to direct appeal. It also appears that a death penalty applicant can 
seek the appointment of counsel following discovery of the basis for a successive petition. 
Unlike the death penalty applicant, petitioners seeking relief under Title 49 must first 
identify claims and then prepare and file the initial and any successive petitions without the 
assistance oflegal counsel. Accordingly, what is reasonable for the petitioner in a non capital 
case is entirely distinct from what is reasonable for the death penalty petitioner or a petitioner 
whose death penalty was converted to a sentence of life following post-conviction proceedings 
under I.C. § 19-2719. 
b. It is not unreasonable to wait until underlying proceedings are complete to 
initiate a successive action 
As argued in Mr. Jimenez's opening brief, requiring concurrent proceedings would lead 
to unnecessary litigation in situations where the petitioner secures relief on appeal and, as 
illustrated by the district court's reasoning with respect to Mr. Jimenez's DNA claim, requiring 
concurrent litigation on related issues could lead to confusion and inconsistent results. 
Additionally, a petitioner would have no way of knowing he is expected to initiate a successive 
proceeding while the initial proceedings remain pending. Outside the unique context of the 
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unified procedures in death penalty cases, the time to collaterally attack a prior proceeding begins 
to run when that prior action becomes final. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(l)(A) (time period for state 
prisoners to file petition for federal habeas corpus relief begins to run on "the date on which the 
judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for 
seeking such review"); 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) (the time during which a properly filed 
application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent 
judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this 
subsection); LC. § 19-4902 (post-conviction relief proceeding may be initiated at any time within 
one year "from the expiration of the time for appeal or from the determination of an appeal or 
from the determination of a proceeding following an appeal, whichever is later). 
A petitioner in Mr. Jimenez's position would reasonably expect that the time to raise any 
successive claims would not begin to run until following conclusion of the initial proceedings, 
just as his time to file post-conviction did not begin until the direct appeal was final and as the 
time to initiate any federal habeas proceedings is tolled until state post-conviction proceedings 
are final. The interpretation proffered by the state, which begins the time to initiate a successive 
post-conviction proceeding in non capital cases following the trial's conclusion without 
consideration of the pendency of related proceedings, creates confusion and injustice. 
For instance, the state claims that Mr. Jimenez "knew" the factual basis for his claim that 
counsel was ineffective for failing to secure DNA testing of the blood on the shoes immediately 
following trial and, therefore, his successive petition was not filed within a reasonable time. 
Under this reasoning, Mr. Jimenez's claim would have been untimely long before the time to 
actually initiate post-conviction procedures even began. Nor is the state's exclusive focus on the 
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discovering the factual basis for the claim helpful in a case such as this one that involves a claim 
raised in a successive petition that was "inadequately raised in the" in the initial proceedings for 
sufficient reason, rather than a newly discovered claim that was not raised at all during the initial 
proceedings. 
Accordingly, whether related proceedings remain pending must necessarily be considered 
in determining the reasonable time to initiate a successive petition for post-conviction relief 
under J.C. § 19-4908. Because Mr. Jimenez filed the instant successive petition while the 
proceedings from the initial petition remain pending, he necessarily filed it within a reasonable 
time. 
2. Mr. Jimenez filed his successive petition within a reasonable time 
The district court found that Mr. Jimenez had "notice" that his claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel for failing to secure DNA evidence was inadequately presented the date the 
district court denied the motion for testing on September 19, 2011, and thus, analyzed whether 
the successive claim was filed within a reasonable time from that date. CR 177. However, the 
only "notice" provided on that date was that the motion was denied. Mr. Jimenez was not 
transported to the hearing and did not have access to the district court's reasoning until the 
transcript was prepared for this appeal. Further, Mr. Jimenez did not know that district court 
would deny his petition because "DNA testing has not been performed" and it was "therefore, 
impossible to determine what impact DNA testing would have had on the verdict" after the 
district court dismissed his initial petition on May 18, 2012. See Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and Order, p. 10. Mr. Jimenez has argued that the district court's decision to deny DNA 
testing was erroneous and that issue remains pending. 
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The record reveals that the lab report, which Mr. Jimenez attached to his petition was 
issued on February 1, 2013. 1 CR 106-08. While reasonableness is not measured from the date a 
complete "cache of evidence" is obtained, those DNA results were instrumental to establish that 
his ineffective assistance of counsel claim was inadequately presented due to sufficient reason. 
Further, a year has been legislatively determined to be a reasonable time for a pro se non 
death penalty litigant to seek post-conviction relief. It follows that even though a year is not per 
se reasonable, it is generally a reasonable time to present successive claims after discovering the 
reason prior claims were inadequately presented or from the date the basis for a new claim is 
discovered. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (I-year period oflimitation for a writ of habeas corpus by a 
person in state custody runs from the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims 
presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence); Hernandez v. State, 
133 Idaho 794, 799, 992 P.2d 789, 794 (Ct. App. 1999) (one year is a reasonable time for an 
inmate to proceed pro se with a successive post conviction relief action). Time limits generally 
begin to run after a prior action becomes final and thus it is generally understood that the time to 
1In a footnote, the state avers that this report was not helpful because it identified the 
victim as the source of blood in Mr. Jimenez's pants' pocket and a knife found along the road 
near the crime scene in addition to excluding the victim as the source of blood on the shoes. 
Respondent's Brief, p. 9 n.4. However, Mr. Jimenez received ineffective assistance of counsel 
because trial counsel refused to obtain testing on the shoes despite his request. Mr. Jimenez did 
not ask counsel to test the pants and the trial transcript reveals that the state was apparently 
unaware there was any blood in the pockets of Mr. Jimenez's pants. The fact that the federal 
government elected to analyze the pants' in no way reflects that the state would have if counsel 
had performed effectively and secured testing on the shoes. Further, the alleged link between 
Mr. Jimenez and the knife was weak, especially in comparison to the considerable weight the 
state gave to the blood on the shoes. Thus, while the testing results regarding the pants might 
prove problematic for Mr. Jimenez on any re-trial, those results have no bearing on whether the 
outcome of the trial would have been different had trial counsel established that the blood on the 
shoes was not Mr. Voshall's. See also Appellant's Brief, p. 14-16. 
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file a successive petition would not begin until proceedings with respect to the prior proceedings 
were final. 
Without any statutory or judicial guidance, successive petitioners are left with no 
guidelines to know when they are required bring a successive action. While the reasonableness of 
the time frame to bring a successive action is determined on a case by case basis and 
reasonableness necessarily includes an analysis of when the petitioner received notice, petitioners 
cannot be required to file a successive petition while proceedings on the prior action remain 
pending. Because Mr. Jimenez's appeal from the denial of the initial petition remains pending, 
his successive petition was necessarily timely and the district court thus erred in concluding that 
the successive petition was untimely. 
B. The Case Should be Remanded so That Mr. Jimenez Has the Opportunity to Amend 
His Petition in Light of Murphy 
Mr. Jimenez reasonably relied on the law as it existed at the time in supporting his 
successive petition and, thus, focused on developing his claim that his post-conviction claims 
were inadequately presented during initial proceedings due to ineffective assistance of post-
conviction counsel. Now that the law has changed while the case was pending, justice dictates 
that he be allowed to amend his claim that he should be allowed to further explain that he did not 
validly waive his post-conviction petition and further explain his sufficient reasons to justify a 
successive petition. 
In response, the state argues that such a remand would be inconsistent with Murphy v. 
State, 156 Idaho 389,327 P.3d 365 (2014) because the petition in that case was not remanded. 
However, in Murphy, no other potential sufficient reason was apparent from the record. Here, in 
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contrast, Mr. Jimenez alleged that he did not validly waive the claims presented in the successive 
petition. Additionally, the existence of the DNA testing confirming that the blood on Mr. 
Jimenez's shoes did not belong to the victim presents a potential sufficient reason independent of 
the post-conviction counsel's alleged deficiency with respect to that claim. 
The state also suggests that a remand allowing amendment in light of Murphy would give 
Mr. Jimenez an unfair "third" bite at the opportunity to cure any deficiencies in his petition. 
Respondent's Brief, p. 14. However, both parties and the district court all relied on established 
precedent in determining whether there was a sufficient reason to file a successive petition. 
There is nothing unfair about allowing Mr. Jimenez the opportunity to further support his claim 
that he did not waive his post-conviction claims after the Idaho Supreme Court completely 
altered the rules. 
Mr. Jimenez should be allowed to present facts to support his claim in his pro se 
successive petition that he did not waive the claims raised therein during the initial proceedings. 
While the absence of any waiver may have a factual nexus with any ineffective assistance by 
post-conviction counsel, the inquiry would necessarily focus on what Mr. Jimenez knew rather 
than counsel's performance. Mr. Jimenez should also have the opportunity develop other 
potential sufficient reasons. 
C. The District Court Erred in Summarily Dismissing Mr. Jimenez's Post-Conviction 
Relief Petition Because He Presented Issues of Material Fact Entitling Him to an 
Evidentiary Hearing 
As explained in Mr. Jimenez's opening brief, the district court erred in summarily 
dismissing Mr. Jimenez's post-conviction relief petition because he presented issues of material 
fact entitling him to an evidentiary hearing. In response, the state adopted as its "argument on 
8 
appeal the reasoning set forth in the district court's order of summary dismissal, as well as that 
articulated by the state in its Respondent's brief filed in" Mr. Jimenez's prior appeal. 
Respondent's Brief, p. 15. In reply, Mr. Jimenez incorporates his reply to the state's brief in 
Docket No. 40109. For the convenience of the Court, a copy of the relevant portions of the 
Reply Brief filed in Docket No. 40109 is appended to this brief. 
III. CONCLUSION 
For all the reasons set forth above and in his opening brief, Mr. Jimenez respectfully asks 
this Court to reverse the district court's judgment dismissing his successive post-conviction 
claims and to remand this case for further proceedings. 
Respectfully submitted this 15th day of April, 2014. 
y Robyn Fyffe 
Attorneys for Juan Anthony Jimenez 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 15th day of April, 2014, I caused two true and correct 
copies of the foregoing to be mailed to: Office of the Attorney General, P.O. Box 83720, Boise, 
ID 83720-0010. 
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being concluded by judicial relief- i.e. an order remanding the case to the district court with 
instruction to consider Mr. Jimenez's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in light of the 
DNA testing establishing that the blood on the shoes did not belong to Mr. VoshalL 
Accordingly, the district court's error in refusing DNA testing is not moot and this Court should 
consider the claim. 
B. The District Court Erred in Summarily Dismissing Mr. Jimenez's Post-Conviction 
Relief Petition Because He Presented Issues of Material Fact Entitling Him to an 
Evidentiary Hearing 
1. The District Court Erred in Summarily Dismissing Mr. Jimenez's Claim 
That He Received Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Because Counsel Refused 
to Request DNA Testing of the Blood Found on Mr. Jimenez's Shoes 
Trial counsel performed deficiently in failing to obtain further testing of the blood on Mr. 
Jimenez's shoes, even after Mr. Jimenez explained that the blood came from a fight with a 
person named Xavier. Further, such testing would have excluded Mr. Voshall as the source of 
that blood and, thus, the State would not have been able to rely on the shoes to support Mr. 
Jimenez's alleged guilt. Accordingly, there is a reasonable probability that if the testing had been 
done, the outcome of the trial would have been different. 
The State's argument in response appears to center around the assumption that trial 
counsel would have shared incriminating testing results with the prosecution. See Respondent's 
Brief p. 15-16. Thus, the State urges that: "it would have at best been a risky proposition for trial 
counsel to have sought DNA testing before trial without knowing for certain what the results of 
that testing would be." Respondent's Briefp. 16, n. 5. In light of this "risk" combined with what 
it characterizes as the DNA testing's "de minimis exculpatory value," the State claims Mr. 
Jimenez did not present an issue of fact sufficient to overcome the presumption that counsel 
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provided effective assistance. 
It is unclear from the State's argument why trial counsel would have made the State privy 
to his strategy and investigation or disclosed any testing results that were hann:ful to Mr. 
Jimenez. Thus, even if reasonable to assume one's client is being untruthful regarding the facts 
of the case in deciding what course of investigation to take, it was not objectively reasonable to 
forgo· testing critical evidence because the results might not have been favorable. · Moreover, the 
ability to infer the blood on Mr. Jimenez's shoes came from the victim provided the State with a 
critical piece of evidence and the value of depriving the State of that evidence can not be 
described as de minimis. Thus, Mr. Jimenez was entitled to an evidentiary hearing as to whether 
trial counsel's decision to forgo DNA testing was objectively reasonable and whether the results 
of the trial would have been different had such testing been accomplished. 
a. there is an issue of fact regarding counsel's deficient performance 
Counsel was entitled to access to the blood sample to conduct his own analysis and 
investigation. See I.C.R.16(b)(4). Counsel would only have been required to disclose the 
specifics and reports of such testing ifhe intended to introduce them in evidence at the trial or to 
present testimony related to those results or reports. I. C.R. 16( c )(2). It should go without saying 
that competent trial counsel would not have informed the prosecutor of his precise reasoning for 
obtaining a sample of the blood or the precise testing obtained. As described by Justice White: 
Law enforcement ... must be dedicated to making the criminal trial a procedure 
for the ascertainment of the true facts surrounding the commission of the crime ... 
But defense counsel has no comparable obligation to ascertain or present the truth. 
Our system assigns him a different mission .... The State has the obligation to 
present the evidence. Defense counsel need present nothing, even ifhe knows 
what the truth is. He need not furnish any witnesses to the police, or reveal any 
confidences of his client, or furnish any other information to help the 
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prosecution's case. 
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 256-57 (1967)(Justice White joined by Justices Harlan and 
Stewart, dissenting in part and concurring in part). 
It would have been objectively unreasonable for trial counsel to share his reasons for 
requesting a sample of the blood on the shoes with the prosecutor1 or to share those results with 
the prosecution unless favorable. That Mr. Jimenez obtained a sample of the blood to conduct 
his own investigation would not necessarily prompt the State to assume DNA testing would be 
1 In State v. Wood, 132 Idaho 88, 100,967 P.2d 702, 714 (1998), the Court indicated that 
the public defender statute did not "guarantee" an ex parte application for investigative assistance 
and that the prosecutor knowledge's "of the application" did not deny the defendant due process. 
The Court thus held that trial counsel "did not provide ineffective assistance of counsel by 
making the requests for assistance in open court with notice to the prosecutor." Here, trial 
counsel was privately retained and, thus, would not have sought funding for the DNA testing in 
open court.. Whether counsel would have been ineffective in sharing trial strategy with the 
prosecution without the necessity of requesting funds is entirely distinct from the circumstance 
presented in Wood. In any event, nothing in Wood suggests that an attorney could not request 
funding for testing on an ex parte basis when that request would reveal client confidences and 
trial strategy. Instead, Wood indicates the statute does not "guarantee" the availability of such a 
procedure and counsel was not ineffective iri making the prosecutor aware of the "application" in 
that case. Wood should not stand for the proposition that the inability to access funding for 
necessary experts on an ex parte basis never violates due process, especially in circumstances in 
,.. which supporting the request would require counsel to reveal client communications or defense 
strategy that would have otherwise remained secret. Principles of fundamental fairness 
guaranteed by due process require that the basic tools of an adequate defense be provided to 
those defendants who cannot afford to pay for them. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 76 (1985); 
United States v. Chase, 499 F.3d 1061, 1066 (9th Cir. 2007). Indigent defendants who must seek 
state-funding to hire an expert should not be required to reveal their theory of defense when their 
more affluent counterparts, with funds to hire experts, are not required to reveal their theory of 
defense. Moore v. State, 889 A.2d 325, 341-42 (Md. 2005). Thus, Congress and several states 
provide a mechanism whereby a defendant can submit an ex parte request for investigative 
services. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3006A(e) (requiring ex parte hearing when indigent defendant needs 
funds); Moore, 889 A.2d at 341 (listing statutes in Minnesota, South Carolina, Te'nnessee, 
Nevada and New York that require an ex parte hearing when an indigent defendant requests 
funds and indicating that courts in Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, 
Michigan, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, and Washington have held that an ex parte hearing is 
required). 
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completed or to change its own decision to limit its testing to confirming that the blood was 
human. Moreover, Mr. Jimenez specifically requested that the shoes be tested because he knew 
the blood came from someone other than the victim. Requesting testing of the blood found on 
the shoes was only a "risky proposition" if counsel assumed Mr. Jimenez was lying and planned 
to share his strategy with the prosecution. 
The State also suggests that "avoiding testing of the knife may also have played a role in 
counsel's tactical choice to not seek testing of the shoes." Respondent's Brief p. 16, n. 5. 
However, Mr. Jimenez's explanation of the blood on the shoes would not have prompted trial 
counsel to request DNA testing of the knife. Even if testing the shoes resulted in testing the 
knife, it was more critical to exclude the victim as the source of blood on the shoes than on the 
knife. As described more fully below and in Mr. Jimenez's Opening Brief, the State used the 
blood on the shoes to strenuously argue that Mr. Jimenez stabbed the victim even though the 
witnesses were only able to testify to a push. While confirmation that the blood on the knife 
belonged to the victim certainly would have tied the knife to the offense, it would not have 
furthered the State's theory that it was Mr. Jimenez rather than his friend who stabbed the victim. 
Mr. Jimenez presented an issue of fact sufficient to rebut the presumption of trial 
counsel's effective assistance. Accordingly, he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing and the 
district court erred in summarily dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief. 
b. prejudice 
The State not only introduced the shoes into evidence, it repeatedly relied oh the blood to 
support Mr. Jimenez's guilt in closing argument. Accordingly, had DNA testing of those shoes 
excluded Mr. Voshal1 as the source of the blood, the State would have been deprived of a critical 
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piece of its circumstantial evidence puzzle and there is a reasonable probability the outcome of 
the trial would have been different. 
The State responds that since the DNA evidence would not have conclusively excluded 
Mr. Jimenez as the person who stabbed Mr. Voshall, such evidence had minimal exculpatory 
value. However, that the testing would not have not completely exonerated Mr. Jimenez does 
not render the value of the evidence de minimis, particularly in light of the evidence against Mr. 
Jimenez and the role the shoes played in the trial. 
After admitting it did not have direct evidence that Mr. Jimenez stabbed Mr. Voshall, the 
State argued the jury should find Mr. Jimenez guilty based on the other evidence combined. R 
Vol. 2 p. 283 (p. IO, In. 4 - p. 12, In. 18). The State strenuously argued that the blood on Mr. 
Jimenez's shoes showed he had stabbed Mr. Voshall, including repeated emphasis on the blood's 
position on the shoes and asking the jury to question how else the blood would have gotten there. 
Id. 283 (p. 12, 22-25); p. 284 (p. 14, In. 25 - p. 15, In. 10); (p. 15, In. 13-24); p. 285 (p. 17; In. 17-
25); p. 289 (p. 34, In. 6-10). The State then held the shoes in front of the jury, indicating "the 
very shoes that [the criminologist] tested. When you look at these, look for the stains. You'll 
notice they're towards the end of the shoes." Id. at p. 290 (p. 40, In. 10-13). 
While the State correctly lists other evidence that supported Mr. Jimenez's guilt -the 
push, the hand in the pocket and the knife along the road [Respondent's Brief, p. 18] - none of 
that evidence directly linked Mr. Jimenez to the stabbing and destroyed his ability to persuasively 
argue that it was his companion who wielded the knife in the same manner as the blood on top of 
the shoes. Had trial counsel obtained DNA testing, the State would have been deprived of 
critical and persuasive evidence of Mr. Jimenez's guilt. Accordingly, there is a reasonable 
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probability that DNA testing would have changed the outcome of the trial and the district court 
erred in summarily dismissing Mr. Jimenez's petition for post-conviction relief. 
2. The District Court Erred in Summarily Dismissing Mr. Jimenez's Claim 
That He Received Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Because Counsel Failed 
to Prepare Mr. Jimenez For Cross-Examination and Failed to Provide Him 
With an Opportunity to Adequately View the Surveillance Video 
Trial counsel performed deficiently by failing to prepare Mr. Jimenez for cross-
examination and by failing to ensure that Mr. Jimenez had an adequate opportunity to view the 
video surveillance. Mr. Jimenez was prejudiced by .that performance because he was unprepared 
for the prosecutor's questions on cross-examination and had difficulty answering questions about 
the video. The district court therefore erred in summarily dismissing Mr. Jimenez's post-
conviction relief petition. 
In response, the State contends that Mr. Jimenez "failed to articulate how trial counsel 
was supposed to divine the questions the prosecutor ultimately asked or what counsel could have 
done to improve Jimenez's memory of the events of the evening in question." Respondent's 
Brief, p. 22. However, Mr. Jimenez alleged that trial counsel "never prepared me to testify, we 
did not practice any questioning, and he did not tell me what questions to expect on 
cross-examination." R. Vol. 3, p. 366 ,r 13 (emphasis added). That no attorney can predict the 
precise questions a prosecutor will ask does not mean that counsel should not have discussed the 
likely themes and approaches of the prosecutor's cross-examination, recommended methods of 
response and otherwise provide Mr. Jimenez with some idea of what to expect. Similarly, by 
running through the topics likely to come out during the testimony, Mr. Jimenez would have 
necessarily jogged his memory regarding the events and had a better recoIJection when 
9 
questioned by the prosecutor. 
The State also notes that Mr. Jimenez did not specifically allege that he asked his attorney 
to reserve a conference room in order to better view the video. As described in Mr. Jimenez's 
Opening Brief, such a request can be inferred from the record and, in any event, it is counsel's 
responsibility to request adequate facilities to allow clients to review the evidence against them. 
Denying access to contact visits so attorneys can review audio and video discovery with criminal 
defendants would be a deprivation of the effective assistance of counsel. 
Mr. Jimenez presented sufficient evidence to present an issue of fact as to whether trial 
counsel performed deficiently by failing to prepare him for cross-examination and by failing to 
ensure that he had an adequate opportunity to view the video surveillance. Mr. Jimenez was 
prejudiced by that performance because he was unprepared for the prosecutor's questions on 
cross-examination and unable to answer questions about the video, which made him seem 
evasive to thejury. The district court therefore erred in summarily dismissing Mr. Jimenez's 
) 
post-conviction relief petition. 
3. Other Reasons the District Court Erred in Summarily Dismissing Mr. 
Jimenez's Post-Conviction Relief Petition Because He Presented Issues of 
Material Fact Entitling Him to an Evidentiary Hearing 
As to the other basis for reversal set forth in Mr. Jimenez's Opening Brief, he does not 
have any additional reply to the arguments presented in the State's Brief. 
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